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INTEREST ARBITRATION IMPASSE RATES 
DANIEL RICKETSON 
University of Rhode Island 
 
Interest arbitration is an important tool in public sector bargaining, since public safety workers 
are prohibited from striking. There is concern, however, over the effects of interest arbitration 
on impasse rates, most notably theorized by the so-called “chilling” and “narcotic” effects. 
Overall, interest arbitration has been associated with an increase in impasse rates compared to 
situations where workers are allowed to go on strike, but the reasons and extent to which this 
is the case are debatable. Previous theoretical work suggests a strong chilling effect on 
negotiations when interest arbitration is an option, but the empirical support for this theory is 
limited. As well, empirical support for a narcotic effect is weak, at least after the first three 
years of bargaining under interest arbitration.  Although we are generally in a period 
retrenchment of bargaining rights, this issue remains an important one, particularly in states 
where the extension of interest arbitration to new groups (e.g. teachers) is being debated and 
in light of the interest arbitration provisions of recent Employee Free Choice Act. 
 
In U.S. labor relations, two parties come 
together to negotiate a contract.  In the 
overwhelming number of cases a settlement is 
reached without impasse. There are, however, 
times when the process breaks down. In the 
private sector, when an agreement cannot be 
reached, a job action may occur:  workers may 
strike or the employer may lock out.  In the public 
sector, strikes and lockouts are widely prohibited.  
And this is universally true for public safety 
workers, hence the need for an orderly process to 
deal with negotiations impasses. 
Currently, the most popular process to settle 
public safety workers' contracts is interest 
arbitration. With interest arbitration a single third-
party neutral or tripartite panel decides, in 
accordance with statute and/or regulation, what 
the terms of new agreement will be.  The threat of 
interest arbitration is meant to urge the two 
parties to come up with a mutual agreement 
rather than face terms imposed by a third party. 
In that interest arbitration may be less costly 
than a strike or lockout, there is some question as 
to the strength of the threat of interest 
arbitration. However, there does not appear to be 
a readily available method of impasse resolution 
that is better than interest arbitration in most 
cases. 
Given that interest arbitration is the most 
common method for ending impasses among 
public safety employees, it is important to look at 
whether or not this system works as it is intended. 
The main question concerns the practice’s impact 
on impasse rates. When the two parties come 
together to negotiate a contract, does the threat 
of interest arbitration move them to be more 
likely to settle through negotiations, or to use 
interest arbitration?  There are multiple factors 
that affect a negotiator’s mindset, however this 
paper attempts to discover what impact interest 
arbitration has on settlement rates. There is also 
the question of what form of interest arbitration 
has the least impact on impasse rates, be it 
conventional arbitration or “final offer” 
arbitration. These two forms are the most 
commonly used forms of interest arbitration, so 
knowing which one is more effective at persuading 
the parties to come to an agreement on their own 
is important. 
FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 
Types of Interest Arbitration 
At its core, interest arbitration is a process 
wherein an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators takes 
evidence from both the employer and the union 
and ultimately fashions a collective bargaining 
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agreement. The arbitrator uses information such 
as past agreements, similar agreement, and the 
parties’ current offers to decide on an appropriate 
contract. Like a grievance procedure that ends in 
arbitration, the hope is that both parties will be 
able to come to an agreement before the final 
step, i.e. a third party decision, is necessary. 
In practice, there are two types of Interest 
arbitration. The first type of interest arbitration is 
generally referred to as “conventional” interest 
arbitration. This form forces the arbitrator to 
make a decision that is somewhere within the 
bounds of the final offers of the two parties. The 
second type is known as “final offer” or “last best 
offer” arbitration. With final offer arbitration, the 
arbitrator must choose one of the parties’ final 
offers. These different methods are important in 
that they each have a distinct effect on the 
negotiation process. 
Conventional Interest Arbitration. In 
conventional interest arbitration, the arbitrator is 
free to give an award that is either one side's final 
offer, or somewhere in between the final offers. 
This method gives the widest range of possibilities 
for a contract. It is also the most commonly 
practiced form of interest arbitration. The idea 
behind this structure is that there is uncertainty on 
where between the final offers the arbitrator will 
decide. This is somewhat undermined by the fact 
that many states require in their law that an 
arbitrator base his/her decision on a rigid equation 
including ability to pay and comparability to other 
agreements. It is important to note that this 
method has been seen to provide less of a chilling 
effect than final offer arbitration has in 
observational studies (Dickinson, 2004). Of the 
two methods of interest arbitration, this approach 
seems to lead to the best chance of a negotiated 
settlement. 
Final Offer Arbitration. Final offer arbitration 
is newer than conventional interest arbitration, as 
it was first developed in 1966 (Hanany, Kilgour, & 
Gerchak, 2007) and first used in 1971 in Oregon 
(Subbarao, 1978).  This method is further divided 
into two different approaches. One of these 
approaches is to look at the full final offers from 
both sides, and to choose one of them as being the 
best option. The other method is to look at each 
outstanding issue and to choose one side’s over 
the others on an issue by issue basis. One issue 
with final offer arbitration is that it has a tendency 
to force both sides into Nash's equilibrium, leaving 
both sides unwilling to move adjust their stances 
in order to settle the contract. The arbitrator will 
decide which side has the fairest offer, so if both 
sides believe that theirs is fair and stand nothing 
to gain from any concession, they will not likely 
arrive at a negotiated settlement. 
Legal Framework 
One important point is that each state (and, in 
some cases, municipalities or agencies) has the 
ability to make its own rules regarding interest 
arbitration. Employees covered by interest 
arbitration statutes are generally public safety 
workers in a particular state, so it is up to that 
state to make the rules surrounding settling 
negotiations. Most states that use interest 
arbitration have a system where arbitrators are 
allowed, and even encouraged, to mediate the 
disagreement throughout the arbitration 
proceedings (Malin, 2013). Other states see 
arbitration as more of a legal proceeding, where 
there are strict rules regarding how each section 
of the contract is awarded (Malin, 2013). In these 
states, there are instances of judges overturning 
contracts due to not placing emphasis on certain 
criteria over others. 
Additional differences in state statutes include 
who is arbitrating. In states such as New York and 
Pennsylvania, the parties use a tripartite panel 
(Malin, 2013). Such panels consist of a neutral and 
one person representing each party. Each side, 
therefore, has an opportunity to communicate 
with the neutral arbitrator through their 
representatives throughout the process. Other 
states, such as New Jersey and Nebraska, have just 
one arbitrator make a decision on the contract 
(Malin, 2013). The statutes in place in those two 
states are stricter in how the arbitrator makes 
decisions than in states with the tripartite system.  
It is important to note that not all states allow 
for or require interest arbitration. There are states 
that do not allow public sector bargaining, so they 
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would not even have a need for interest 
arbitration. Even in states that do allow public 
sector bargaining, there are other ways to resolve 
impasse. For some states, when two parties do not 
come to an agreement, the contract will be given 
up to the legislature to decide what will be the 
appropriate contract. In most other situations, the 
two parties will simply live under the previous 
contract until they can agree a new one. Because 
having public safety workers go on strike is so 
dangerous for the general public, this method is 
still better than allowing them to go on strike.  
Theoretical Framework 
In addressing problems with interest 
arbitration, scholars have tested both the chilling 
and narcotic effect of the practice. These theories 
were developed as ways to explain or predict 
interest arbitration impasse behaviors. Nash's 
equilibrium influences these mid-level theories in 
that it provides an underlying theory of impasses. 
However, Nash's equilibrium does not take into 
account many of the other variables that could 
lead to impasse, so it is not particularly useful as 
an all-encompassing theory of collective 
bargaining behavior. Nonetheless, it is important 
to have a basic understanding of it in order to see 
that impasse may occur even without outside 
factors pressuring the bargaining partners, and as 
such it is important for finding the potential root 
of the chilling effect or the narcotic effect.  
Nash's Equilibrium. When two parties 
negotiate, there is potential for them never to 
come to an agreement. In game theory, when two 
parties have reached a point where changing their 
position would render no benefit to them given 
what the other party has offered, this is called 
Nash's equilibrium (Champlin & Bognanno, 1985). 
Nash's equilibrium is an important concept for 
interest arbitration, as the point at which this 
equilibrium is reached can lead to impasse, and, 
therefore, interest arbitration. This theory is 
necessary to understand before talking about the 
chilling and narcotic effects because it explains 
how an impasse may develop. Impasse due to 
Nash's equilibrium, however, is an impasse that 
relies on purely rational actors in a bargaining 
scenario. A completely rational actor is an 
impossible idea in collective bargaining, as there 
are many other factors that go into negotiations 
besides the economic factors, and there isn't 
always perfect information between the parties.  
Chilling and Narcotic Effects.  
The most popular theories concerning 
problems with interest arbitration are the chilling 
effect and the narcotic effect. Each of these effects 
has been studied to understand how interest 
arbitration influences negotiations.  
The chilling effect occurs when parties favor 
an early impasse instead of bargaining to a 
settlement. The idea is that the negotiators feel 
that they cannot possibly get a good settlement, 
and that there will be no loss of productivity or 
money due to the interest arbitration system, so 
they might as well arbitrate rather than settle. 
Outside factors are not account for in the theory.  
Rather, in order for the chilling effect to be 
operative, the parties must stop negotiating due 
to their ability to achieve a contract through 
arbitration that is more beneficial than a contract 
through a negotiated settlement. This means that 
parties would not be subject to a chilling effect, 
per se, if they favor an early impasse due to 
political or other outside pressures. This definition 
of the chilling effect is both beneficial and 
unfortunate, because it is precise yet constrained. 
It is beneficial in the fact that it can be tested in 
experiments and through observation. The 
problem, however, is that the definition does not 
take into account other factors that often affect 
impasses in negotiations. Unfortunately, there is 
no other theory in the literature that does 
incorporate outside factors. 
The narcotic effect is defined as a consistent 
recurring use of interest arbitration—that is, the 
parties have become addicted to interest 
arbitration. Reliance on arbitration rather than 
negotiations is an abuse of a practice that is 
intended to be used only in exceptional 
circumstances. This abuse may occur when 
interest arbitration is perceived as having a low 
cost or low risk.   
The problem with the narcotic effect is that it 
allows for lazy negotiating, where parties only 
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negotiate as a formality instead of working on 
lasting solutions for their problems. If parties are 
subject to the narcotic effect, they are essentially 
not bargaining, but rather having a third party 
continually decide their contract.  
Model 
In order to explore the issue of interest 
arbitration, one must start with a working model 
of negotiations. The model for negotiations is 
based on of Rubinstein's bargaining model. This 
model is merely a beginning of the model used in 
this paper, but it is the basis for generally used 
bargaining methods. While Rubinstein's 
bargaining model begins the process of 
negotiations, the model continues to show what 
happens in a system where the bargaining process 
is not allowed to end unless a contract is created. 
Rubinstein's Bargaining Model. Rubinstein's 
bargaining model comes from game theory. The 
idea behind the model is that each party starts 
with a position that is different from the opposing 
party. They will then each take turns moving 
towards the other party's position until they either 
agree with each other or they have nothing left to 
gain by changing their position. When the two 
parties reach a place where neither side has 
anything to gain by changing its position, they are 
in Nash's equilibrium. 
Negotiation Model. The negotiation model 
starts with Rubinstein's bargaining model. As the 
two sides go back and forth, if they do not reach 
an agreement, they have two options. The first 
option is to move to a non-binding process of 
mediation or fact finding. The mediator will then 
attempt to get both parties to agree to a contract, 
however this may or may not be effective.  This 
then may be followed by interest arbitration. 
When the parties reach the process of interest 
arbitration, they have entered into a form of 
equilibrium. When the parties are unable to come 
to an agreement as rational parties who have 
nothing more to gain by offering a concession, 
they are in Nash's equilibrium (Subbarao, 1978). 
However, given other factors that alter how either 
party might behave, there are other equilibriums 
that may be reached. The other forms of 
equilibrium are reached when the payoff for no 
longer bargaining outweighs the payoff for 
continuing to bargain. There may still be a solution 
that is acceptable to both parties by continued 
bargaining, but if one party has even more to gain 
by not bargaining, they will stop bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal/External Politics 
Funding 
State Laws 
Negotiations 
Settlement 
Mediation 
Fact Finding 
Interest 
Arbitration 
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MEDIATING AND EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Disputant Optimism and Risk Aversion 
Interest arbitration has multiple effects on the 
mindset of negotiators. For example, a party may 
be more willing to proceed to interest arbitration 
if it expects to have a sympathetic arbitrator. 
Arbitration is a field where being neutral is 
necessary to one’s professional standing. Without 
being completely neutral in every case, an 
arbitrator could develop a reputation for being 
more beneficial to one party than the other. When 
this happens, or if negotiators perceive a 
particular bias towards their party, then they have 
what is called “disputant optimism” (Dickinson, 
2004). The idea is that the negotiator, or 
disputant, is optimistic that his or her offer is more 
likely to get a favorable outcome than the other 
side. Those who do not believe that the arbitrator 
will be favorable towards them tend to be more 
likely to reach a settlement, even if it is not one 
that they particularly want. The perception of 
neutrality in a third party is important in an 
interest arbitration system, which is why it is 
important that both sides have an equal say in 
selecting the arbitrator.  Similarly, a tripartite 
panel assures that all sides are represented in the 
decision (Malin, 2013).  
Risk aversion is also an important concept for 
all negotiations. Theoretically, final offer 
arbitration was created so that parties have a 
higher level of risk when entering arbitration 
(Dickinson, 2004). Parties do not want the high risk 
associated with going to arbitration, because 
there is the potential that they will not win. The 
more risk averse a negotiator is, the more likely 
they are to give concessions knowing that if they 
do they will get a contract. Even if the contract is 
not what they want, it is perceived as being safer 
than going to an arbitrator who could give over all 
the demands to the other side. In theory, this 
reduces impasse rates in final offer arbitration 
states. Conventional arbitration is known to be 
less risky, because there is a perceived notion that 
the arbitrator will end up splitting the economic 
issues halfway between management and the 
union (Dickinson, 2004). This could lead to higher 
impasse rates, as parties see less risk associated 
with going to arbitration versus continuing to 
concede sections of the contract. 
Politics 
In public sector bargaining, politics play a large 
role and, in fact, are inseparable from the 
negotiations process. This will have an impact on 
whether or not a party is willing to go to interest 
arbitration instead of working towards a 
negotiated settlement. Besides governmental 
politics, the politics of a particular organization or 
union has a large impact on negotiator behavior. A 
negotiator for a union might know that he/she 
could never get the contract that the membership 
wants, so he/she might be more willing to go to 
interest arbitration. This allows the negotiator to 
get the contract that he/she would otherwise 
negotiate for, without having to get the 
membership to ratify the contract. This is a 
breakdown of the purpose of the interest 
arbitration system. The system is designed as a last 
resort, and should only be used when negotiations 
are impossible between two parties. If a party uses 
the system to bypass internal organizational 
processes, then it needs to address issues within 
the organization rather than relying on arbitration 
to mask the problems. 
Ability to Pay. The ability to pay is becoming 
increasingly important in public sector bargaining.  
For many years, settlements created unfunded 
liabilities whose effects were felt only years later.  
In the private sector, the company and the union 
negotiate over how to spend money that is 
generated through the firm’s revenues.  In the 
public sector funding comes mainly from taxes, 
but also from the sale of bonds, various 
investments, aid from other levels of government, 
user fees, etc.  Often this means that it is difficult 
to secure funding in the public sector, particularly 
when raising taxes is politically perilous. That said, 
since taxpayers have a legal obligation to pay 
while private sector customers may take their 
business elsewhere, ability to pay can be difficult 
to determine.  Nonetheless, funding is a 
requirement for most arbitrators to look at when 
determining an award.  
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Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement.  
The best solution to getting a contract is generally 
agreed to be a negotiated settlement. However, 
depending on what side one is on, this may not be 
the case. In these events, negotiators will often 
determine what is their best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement, or a BATNA. A BATNA 
comes about in multiple forms, be it going on 
strike, interest arbitration, or operating under an 
expired contract. In the public sector, a BATNA 
could be to go to interest arbitration, because 
comparable pay rates in the area are much higher 
than at that particular organization. If these pay 
rates cannot be achieved through negotiations, 
then the negotiator would be enticed to end 
negotiations in favor of interest arbitration. 
BATNAs are important in negotiating, because one 
cannot be expected to always get a contract that 
satisfies both sides. At times, a BATNA can be used 
as a negotiating tool where one side convinces the 
other that they have options if it does not get what 
it wants in an agreement in order to get a 
settlement.  
OUTCOMES 
Experimental Outcomes 
Before discussing the experimental outcomes, 
it is important to note that the experiments were 
focused on the chilling effect rather than the 
narcotic effect. This is because the narcotic effect 
relies on outside forces that are excluded from the 
negotiating games that make up the experiments 
done in these studies. The chilling effect can be 
distilled to the idea that knowing that there will be 
a non-zero sum solution to the bargaining problem 
negotiators are less likely to bargain to settlement 
if they believe they could lose less by going to 
impasse. This theory has been tested by both 
Orley Ashenfelter's and David Dickinson. 
Ashenfelter's experiment was created to 
determine the difference in impasse rates 
between no arbitration, conventional arbitration, 
final offer arbitration, and a so called tri-offer 
arbitration (Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber, & Spiegel, 
1992). Tri-offer arbitration is a system where the 
arbitrator is forced to pick one of the final offers, 
or a fact-finder's decision. This method is not 
common in most interest arbitration cases, 
however for the sake of inclusion it is used in this 
experiment. The experiment was set up to be a 
bargaining game with four groups. The four groups 
included the three different arbitration groups as 
well as a control group that would not be subject 
to arbitration (Ashenfelter et al., 1992). Bargaining 
would last for twenty rounds, with arbitration 
being introduced after the first ten rounds. At the 
beginning of the experiment, bargainers in the 
control group were told that they would receive a 
small amount of money if they could come to an 
agreement.  If they did not come to an agreement, 
however, they each would receive nothing. The 
arbitration groups were told that after ten rounds 
of bargaining they would be forced into arbitration 
if they could not come to a settlement. Each team 
was told what type of arbitration they would be 
forced to use, however they were not told how the 
arbitrator was to make their decision. They were 
also given a list of previous awards by the 
arbitrator. 
The experiment concluded with interesting 
results. The major result was that impasse rates 
did not change between the first and second sets 
of rounds in the control group; however they 
increased significantly in all other groups. Not only 
did the arbitration groups increase their impasse 
rates, but they started at higher impasse rates in 
the first ten rounds than the control group did 
(Ashenfelter et al., 1992). This finding was 
significant in that it means either the non-control 
groups were randomly less risk adverse than the 
control group, or that because they knew they 
were going to be using arbitration later they were 
experiencing the chilling effect even in the first 
rounds. Holding this finding aside, it is important 
that all the arbitration groups increased their 
impasse rates as it shows that the chilling effect 
can occur even when all outside influence is 
negated.  
What is particularly interesting in this study is 
it demonstrates that contrary to expectations, 
final offer arbitration showed larger impasse rates 
compared to conventional or tri-offer arbitration 
(Ashenfelter et al., 1992). What is strange about 
this is that final offer arbitration has been 
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theorized and studied as causing lower impasse 
rates in general. Ashenfelter comments that the 
reason for this is likely due to the fact that 
bargainers tended to get closer to a settlement 
with final offer arbitration, however failed to 
reach an agreement because they felt that they 
would get a marginally better final result. This is 
because they believed their final offer was the 
most reasonable offer compared to the other 
bargainer, so they were reducing the risk 
associated with impasse in final offer arbitration 
by being closer than their opponent. 
Dickinson's experiment sought to further 
clarify the results from Ashenfelter's study. 
Dickinson took a similar approach to Ashenfelter's, 
however changed a few of the rules. The new rules 
were that each bargaining pair experienced 
negotiations in each of the types of arbitration 
(Dickinson, 2004). Also, Dickinson changed the tri-
offer arbitration type to a type he called CombA 
arbitration, which allowed for either taking the 
final offers or deciding somewhere in between 
(Dickinson, 2004). Finally, Dickinson also explained 
how the arbitrators got to their previous decisions 
as a way to control for how the bargainers decided 
on their strategies. 
The results of this study are similar to the 
results from Ashenfelter's experiment. In general, 
it was found that interest arbitration led to 
significantly higher impasse rates compared to 
non-arbitration bargaining (Dickinson, 2004). Also 
significant is that this study also showed that final 
offer arbitration led to higher impasse rates 
compared to conventional arbitration (Dickinson, 
2004). The highest rate of impasse came from the 
proposed CombA arbitration (Dickinson, 2004). 
This study hypothesized that CombA would lead to 
the lowest rate of impasse, however the author 
found that this was absolutely not the case. The 
finding that impasse rates were greater with 
arbitration is important because it adds to the 
significant literature that attempts to show the 
chilling effect. The fact that both of these 
experimental studies show that final offer 
arbitration leads to greater impasse rates than 
conventional arbitration is interesting, in that it 
shows the opposite from what most observational 
studies show. What is important in this study is 
that the statistical analysis showed that the 
difference in impasse rates from final offer 
arbitration to conventional arbitration were 
barely significant (Dickinson, 2004). Compared to 
the difference between arbitration and non-
arbitration, these findings are not particularly 
important in reality. If the impasse rates were 
extremely different between forms of arbitration, 
then it would be clear that states should adopt one 
form over the other.  If there is little difference, 
however, in actual impasse rates between them, 
then the cost in time and effort to change certain 
state laws in too high. 
Limitations.  These studies are helpful in that 
they provide actual experimental data, however 
they also have significant limitations. Major 
among these limitations is that these negotiation 
games take place in tightly controlled 
environments without any external influence. The 
people who participated do not have any political 
affiliation with one another, nor do they need to 
continue a working relationship with one another. 
They also have no direction or motives other than 
getting the most that they can overall, whereas in 
a real bargaining situation one item in a contract 
will be more important than another. In most 
contracts in the public sector, if both sides cannot 
come to an agreement, they likely will live with the 
current contract. In the experiments, if both sides 
cannot come to an agreement, then both sides 
lose. The difference with these situations is that 
living under a previous contract is not a lose-lose 
situation. Depending on which side is pushing for 
provisions in a new contract, the expiration of a 
previous contract will impact one side over the 
other. This experiment does not take into account 
that one side will likely bend further than the 
other in order to get a contract because they have 
a need to gain certain provisions, such as a pay 
increase or cut. 
Observational Outcomes 
The bulk of the literature on both the chilling 
effect and the narcotic effect comes from 
observing different arbitration systems 
throughout the United States. In this literature, 
 Ricketson – Interest Arbitration 8 
there have been varying degrees of agreement on 
the effects. In general, the chilling effect and the 
narcotic effect appear to be real, and they appear 
to have an effect on impasse in the public sector. 
It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion, since 
different studies have used different definitions 
and methodologies. Due to the varying nature of 
the studies there is room for debate about how 
strong each of these effects are. While it is difficult 
to decide how strong these effects are, there is 
definite evidence that impasse rates are higher in 
interest arbitration than they are in a strike 
system. Also, there is evidence that impasse rates 
are higher in conventional interest arbitration 
than they are in final offer arbitration. 
Chilling Effect. Frederic Champlin and Mario 
Bognanno sought to answer whether or not the 
chilling effect existed in Minnesota, and published 
the results in 1985 (Champlin & Bognanno, 1985). 
The study consisted of tracking data about 
arbitration rates and settlement rates from 1973 
to 1980. The arbitration rates were compared to 
the settlement rates in other parts of the state 
that did not involve interest arbitration. They 
mentioned that there are other factors that may 
need to be controlled in this study, such as politics, 
economic variances, and legal differences. While 
these factors were mentioned, Champlin and 
Bognanno believed that they were unimportant 
for the study, due to the fact that the cases that 
they studied all occurred in similar locations, and 
thus similar circumstances (Champlin & 
Bognanno, 1985). 
The results of this study focused on one major 
conclusion. In cases where interest arbitration was 
the final step of the dispute resolution process, 
thirty percent of negotiations ended up in interest 
arbitration. This is compared to cases where 
employees were allowed to strike and where 
impasse was reached only nine percent of the time 
(Champlin & Bognanno, 1985). This is a significant 
difference in impasse rates. Also in the results, it is 
discussed that they were unable to control for 
some factors that may or may not have been 
important. They discuss that some of the non-
essential employees had the choice of either going 
on strike or asking for interest arbitration, so some 
of the data may or may not have been completely 
accurate. That being said, if they controlled for 
those who went to interest arbitration as non-
essential employees, it would only reduce the nine 
percent, making the contrast to the thirty percent 
even larger. 
One thing that this study was unable to 
explore was the difference in rates between 
different types of interest arbitration. Since the 
state law specifies the type of interest arbitration 
that they use, they would have had to compare to 
a different state using a different arbitration 
scheme. This is not particularly helpful when 
studying interest arbitration impasse rates, 
because they would have to take into account all 
the other economic and political differences 
between the states before they could possibly 
come up with a decent comparison. 
Thomas Kochan wrote a paper in 2010 on both 
the chilling effect and the narcotic effect. This 
paper is the latest addition to his work on the 
subjects that started in the late 1970s. In the 
paper, Kochan looks at data from New York since 
the 1960s to discover how the impasse rates have 
changed over time (Kochan, Lipsky, Newhart, & 
Benson, 2010). The results were less than 
expected, considering the work that had been 
done before, as well as the experimental 
outcomes that have been discussed. Kochan found 
that impasse rates were higher with interest 
arbitration than they were without interest 
arbitration, but the rates were not as high or 
consistent as they had been in the past (Kochan et 
al., 2010). Kochan notes that wages have not 
increased to unsustainable levels, and because 
New York uses a tripartite panel to arbitrate their 
contracts, he believes that there is little to no 
chance of getting a bad award (Kochan et al., 
2010). This is all important, because it would 
appear that the initial fears of interest arbitration 
have mostly gone away. There is still the problem 
that impasse rates tend to increase due to interest 
arbitration, however this might not be as big of a 
problem as it was once believed to be. Compared 
to the price of having workers in public safety 
positions going on strike, having them use interest 
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arbitration a bit more often does not have such a 
high cost. 
Narcotic Effect.  The narcotic effect was one 
of the original theories of what happens to 
impasse rates under interest arbitration. Before 
interest arbitration became an important 
institution in public sector bargaining, there was a 
worry that parties would end up relying on 
interest arbitration time after time instead of 
being able to settle their own contracts. This 
theory has taken an interesting turn in that in 
general it is denounced as being untrue, however 
there is significant evidence that within the first 
three or five years of an interest arbitration law 
being introduced, there does exist a narcotic 
effect. Thomas Kochan was the leading researcher 
into the narcotic effect from the late 1970s to the 
early 1980s, when interest in the topic seemed to 
cease. More recently, there have been a few 
attempts to look at the data again, including by 
Kochan himself. 
One of the first studies on the narcotic effect 
was the 1978 journal article by Thomas Kochan 
and Jean Baderschneider. This study looked at 
rounds of bargaining for New York fire fighters and 
police officers starting from 1968 (Kochan & 
Baderschneider, 1978). They found that since that 
date, there was an increase in impasse rates for 
both fire fighters and police officers. Interest 
arbitration did not become law until 1975 in New 
York, and they discovered that once it had become 
law, impasse rates jumped sixteen percent 
(Kochan & Baderschneider, 1978). Not only were 
parties more likely to go to impasse, but they 
became more likely to successively use interest 
arbitration to settle their contracts. They believed 
that this was a clear indication that the narcotic 
effect existed, and was something to be 
concerned with. In their conclusion they noted 
that the problems that caused the impasse in the 
first place were carried over to future bargaining 
sessions (Kochan & Baderschneider, 1978). This is 
important, as it shows that the narcotic effect 
allows for parties to never truly settle differences 
that could lead to better negotiations in the 
future, instead relying on third parties to write 
contracts. As a form of dispute resolution, interest 
arbitration does not appear to resolve and 
disputes in this study. If both parties are focused 
on just getting a contract instead of fixing 
problems, then they are increasingly likely to use 
interest arbitration in the future. 
Kochan and Baderschneider's findings did not 
seem persuasive to Richard Butler and Ronald 
Ehrenberg. Butler and Ehrengberg decided to 
analyze the same data that was in Kochan and 
Baderschneider's study using a different statistical 
analysis. In their paper, they discussed that 
Kochan and Baderschneider were incorrect in 
their blanket statement that the narcotic effect 
existed (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981). They noticed 
that in the last three bargaining rounds of the fire 
fighters and police officers there existed a reverse 
narcotic effect (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981). By that 
they mean that there was an inverse relationship 
between having gone to interest arbitration and 
then going to use it again. They noted several 
reasons for why this trend emerged. They believed 
that parties used the interest arbitration more 
often at the beginning because it was new, and 
they believed that it would be a cheaper way to 
solve disagreements than going through more 
difficult negotiations (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981). 
The novelty of interest arbitration seemed 
enticing for the parties, because they were given 
an opportunity to negotiate without worry of 
losing out completely. However, Butler and 
Ehrenberg believed that this novelty wore off 
fairly quickly once parties realized that the 
settlements that they were getting from the 
arbitrator were not particularly beneficial to one 
or both sides. As such, they concluded that while 
the narcotic effect appears when an interest 
arbitration law is passed, it quickly subsides due to 
both parties discovering what it actually entails. 
Not to be outdone, Kochan responded to the 
claims that his data was incorrectly analyzed. In an 
article published in 1981, Kochan attempts to 
establish what his original findings were, and how 
Butler and Ehrenberg were able to come up with 
such different results. The argument that Kochan 
gives is that the way that they had done their 
statistical analysis versus how he did his is not 
problematic on its own. However, because they 
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neglected to use data that included groups that 
always or never used interest arbitration, they 
were unable to replicate his results (Kochan & 
Baderschneider, 1981). Kochan and 
Baderschneider explain that using a conditional 
probability test to determine the recurrence of 
impasse allows them to use the total data of 
impasse rates for all fire fighters and police 
officers, however the regression analysis that was 
used in Butler and Ehrenberg's paper ignores a 
subset of the data (Kochan & Baderschneider, 
1981). A different problem that he had with the 
other study was in the definition of the narcotic 
effect. Butler used a strict definition of the 
narcotic effect where the parties must rely on 
interest arbitration always after they use it, 
whereas Kochan used a looser definition that 
allows for periods where parties do not use it as 
often (Kochan & Baderschneider, 1981). A loose 
definition of the narcotic effect allows for an 
understanding that labor relations theory has a 
hard time in perfectly explaining behaviors, 
because so much of what happens is entangled 
with outside factors.  
James Chelius took to the task of trying to find 
an answer that could satisfy both Kochan and 
Butler's studies. In 1985 Chelius published an 
article that looked at the data that both the other 
studies used, as well as data from Iowa, Indiana 
and Pennsylvania' new public sector collective 
bargaining laws. In the study, Chelius uses a 
statistical analysis that both the other studies 
agreed was a fair way to determine the narcotic 
effect (Chelius & Extejt, 1985). In doing so, he also 
defined the narcotic effect as, “a decrease or 
increase in the subsequent use of an impasse 
procedure as a result of the parties' having 
previously used the procedure” (Chelius & Extejt, 
1985). The definition is important, because the 
previous two studies were unable to come to an 
agreement on what the official definition should 
be when looking at the data. Because of this, 
Chelius defines the narcotic effect in a way that 
both parties would be comfortable with, as it is not 
so broad to include other effects such as the 
chilling effect, but is also not so narrow to be 
impossible to determine. After setting up the 
study to be fair to both other sides of the narcotic 
effect argument, Chelius determines that both 
studies have some truth to them (Chelius & Extejt, 
1985). In particular, under the New York data that 
both the other studies analyzed, Chelius found 
that there did exist a narcotic effect within the first 
three years of bargaining, however after that 
there appeared to be no narcotic effect at all 
(Chelius & Extejt, 1985). When interpreting the 
data from the other states, Chelius was unable to 
find any positive narcotic effect, with only a small 
amount of negative narcotic effect in Pennsylvania 
(Chelius & Extejt, 1985). These results are 
important, because looking at just one state's 
particular laws and rules cannot be used to 
determine an overall theory for interest 
arbitration. In looking at three other states, 
Chelius showed that the narcotic effect can exist 
to a small extent, however it is not as important as 
was once feared.  
Limitations.  All the studies on the narcotic 
effect provide good statistical analyses of various 
years and states where interest arbitration occurs. 
However, they still only have addressed four 
states that use interest arbitration and do not 
attempt to see what other states may show. They 
do a good job in explaining how the narcotic effect 
is not particularly persuasive as a theory in interest 
bargaining, however it would be helpful to see 
other states' data as well. There exists another 
problem where the other factors that impact 
bargaining are not addressed. They all succumb to 
the idea that if parties go to impasse multiple 
times, then it is indicative of the narcotic effect. 
This type of study is limited in that there could 
exist a narcotic effect that is not particularly 
powerful.  But due to other political or economic 
issues at hand, the parties may still resolve their 
contract. Trying to determine where the narcotic 
effect exists and to what extent in this case would 
prove to be impossible, however it is worth noting 
that the possibility does exist. 
Other approaches.  Studies have moved 
towards looking at negotiations and alternative 
dispute resolution not within the confines of 
certain effects, but rather on the other conditions 
that benefit or take away from the collective 
bargaining system. These studies have stepped 
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away particularly from the chilling and narcotic 
effects, because they have found that while these 
effects are important, the economic and political 
conditions during negotiations can have a larger 
impact on impasse rates. 
In a retrospective article on public sector 
collective bargaining, Charles Craver explores the 
many factors around collective bargaining. The 
article breaks down public sector collective 
bargaining into areas such as the impact of politics 
on collective bargaining, and dispute resolution 
techniques (Craver, 2013). Each section describes 
the particular problems faced in the public sector 
for each subject. For example, Craver explains how 
alternative dispute resolution techniques were 
created for public sector bargaining because the 
general public called for it, instead of having 
expensive strikes that would be a drain on tax 
dollars (Craver, 2013). The most important section 
of this paper is the section on politics. Craver 
eloquently specifies two major issues to consider 
in public sector bargaining, namely the lack of 
profits and the fact that both parties are political 
in nature (Craver, 2013). Being political in nature 
is meant by the fact that both sides are held up to 
elections for power, so both sides are held 
responsible by their constituents. This leads to 
difficulty in negotiations, because if one side 
agrees to another side's demands, then they are 
seen as weak, or unworthy to lead. This can lead 
to a usage of the arbitration system to relinquish 
any responsibility from the leaders. They would 
want to release their responsibility in the case that 
they know they will not get a decent contract, but 
cannot sell the idea to their constituents without 
getting into trouble themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Impasse is a topic that is crucial to study in 
labor relations. If we are able to reduce the 
amount of impasse that occurs while promoting 
good behaviors from both management and labor, 
then everyone benefits. Interest arbitration does 
not improve impasse rates, however it does help 
with other problems in collective bargaining. For 
one, it allows for collective bargaining to occur 
between public safety workers and the 
government without fear that they will go on 
strike. Also, it allows for some of the more 
politically difficult negotiation situations to go 
forth without embarrassing one side or the other 
unnecessarily. That being said, it also stunts 
genuine agreements from being made. Impasse 
rates are higher in a system that ends with interest 
arbitration than a system that does not include 
interest arbitration at all. During experimental 
studies, it was found that impasse rates increased 
substantially under an interest arbitration system. 
Not only that, but final offer arbitration led to 
impasse more than conventional arbitration. 
Outside of experimental situations, impasse rates 
still were seen as larger under arbitration than 
when striking was an option. The problem with 
this is that it can lead to higher costs to 
negotiations through time and money spent on 
arbitration. However, it is a cheaper alternative to 
a strike situation, but does not do anything to 
promote good labor relations. Parties are not 
compelled to fix their differences in a way that will 
help in future negotiations, but rather are allowed 
to sit back and rely on the system to take care of 
contracts. This is especially an issue if parties tend 
to keep returning to the interest arbitration 
system. 
The narcotic effect appears to have been an 
unnecessary worry, as there is no strong evidence 
that it really exists. If it does exist, then the 
evidence clearly points to the fact that after three 
to five years of an interest arbitration law being 
implemented, the narcotic effect seems to 
disappear. On its own, this shows how the narcotic 
effect is not something that should be a concern 
for its ability to sustain impasse rates, however it 
does have some implications for areas that decide 
to implement an interest arbitration system. The 
Employee Free Choice Act included a provision 
that would have required interest arbitration for a 
first contract. If the evidence about the narcotic 
effect is reliable, it would suggest that the Act 
could have caused a large uptick in impasse and 
therefore interest arbitration in the private sector. 
However, since interest arbitration would not 
have been required after the first contract, the 
increase in impasse rates would likely have 
subsided after the first contract. In terms of public 
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policy, this portion of the Employee Free Choice 
Act could have been problematic for employers in 
particular.  However after the first contract it 
would likely not have contributed to impasse rates 
in a substantial way. 
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